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Abstract
We investigate the conditions under which the first-best allocation without commit-
ment is sustainable in a production economy. While it is widely known in the literature
that allowing capital accumulation creates a distortion, we find that it can help to sustain
the first-best allocation. We also find that for a certain set of endowment economies in
which the efficient allocation is not sustainable, the efficient allocation becomes sustain-
able once we introduce a production technology with small returns to scale. In some
cases, gains from efficient resource allocation between agents can be so large that they
can compensate for the increase in the outside option that arises when capital moves
from the less-productive to the more-productive agent.
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Introduction
In many credit arrangements, a lender cannot force a borrower to commit to a contract to
which both the lender and the borrower initially agreed. This problem, called the limited
commitment, can distort risk-sharing among agents and lead to a welfare loss. It is well
documented that in an endowment economy with limited commitment, the first-best allocation
is more likely to be sustainable as the time discount factor or the variance of endowment
increases. This is because, in such conditions, the value from the outside option decreases,
and, as a result, agents tend to choose not to deviate from the optimal contract.
It is, however, not well understood how agents’ default incentives change when a production
technology is introduced into an economy. Under what conditions is the first-best allocation
without commitment sustainable in a production economy? In particular, what role does
a production technology play in achieving the first-best allocation? Understanding agents’
default incentives is particularly relevant in a production economy because limited commitment
can not only distort risk-sharing but also hinder resource allocation, which maximizes the
aggregate production.
To answer these questions, we introduce a standard growth model featuring a risk-sharing
problem between two agents under a decreasing returns to scale production technology. We
then analytically characterize the conditions under which efficient resource allocation is sus-
tainable without commitment. We find that the relationship between the degree of returns
to scale technology and the agents’ default incentives is highly non-linear. On the one hand,
introducing a production technology and allowing capital accumulation can increase the value
from financial autarky and, hence make it more likely that the enforcement constraint will be
violated. On the other hand, allowing capital accumulation can increase the value from the
optimal contract and, thus help to sustain the efficient resource allocation. In some cases, gains
from efficient resource allocation between agents can be so large that they can compensate for
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the increase in the outside option that arises when capital moves from the less-productive to
the more-productive agent. We also show that for a certain set of endowment economies in
which the optimal contract is not sustainable, the efficient allocation becomes sustainable once
we introduce a production technology with very small returns to scale or any returns to scale
higher than the threshold.
Our result provides a new insight into the role of capital accumulation in agents’ default
incentives. It is well known, though not explicitly shown in the literature, that adding capital
and allowing capital accumulation increase the value from financial autarky, thus making the
enforcement constraint tighter (e.g., Kehoe and Perri (2004); Abraham and Carceles-Poveda
(2006)). Our analytic characterization enables us to clearly show that the opposite can be
true when there is a large additional gain from efficient resource allocation by the planner in
addition to the consumption risk-sharing.
Our model features two types of infinitely-lived agents endowed with the same decreasing
returns to scale production technology, both of whom are uncertain about their future pro-
ductivity. The productivity shocks between the agents are negatively correlated, and for the
sake of simplicity, we assume no aggregate uncertainty. Agents are always better off ex-ante
agreeing with the efficient allocation because they can insure each other and because they can
efficiently allocate capital so that the output from the contract is greater than the sum of
both agents’ output. However, in each period after the shock is realized, the agent with higher
productivity may have an incentive to deviate from the contract, not only because he has
higher productivity, but also because he is assigned a greater amount of capital to maximize
aggregate production.
We characterize the analytic conditions under which the first-best allocation is sustain-
able with limited commitment in terms of the following three key parameters: the degree of
uncertainty (α); time preference (β); and the degree of returns to scale (γ). We specify the
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benchmark endowment economy such that both the value function from the optimal contract
and the value from the outside option in a production economy with γ > 0 uniformly converge
to those in the benchmark endowment economy as γ goes to zero. Consistent with our spec-
ification, the sustainability condition derived in a production economy also converges to the
condition separately derived in the benchmark endowment economy.
We confirm that our results with respect to the first two parameters are consistent with
the literature on risk-sharing in an exchange economy (e.g., Kocherlakota (1996); Alvarez
and Jerman (2000)): As agents value future consumption more or as the fluctuation of the
productivity shock rises, the first-best allocation is more likely to be sustainable due to the
risk-sharing motive. This consistency confirms the validity of our analytic characterization
and also enables us to compare the exchange economy and the (production) economy in which
capital accumulation is allowed.
Our results regarding the technology (that is, the degree of returns to scale) are novel in the
literature. We first show that the relationship between the degree of returns to scale and the
sustainability condition is non-monotonic. We also show that for a certain set of endowment
economies in which the optimal contract is not sustainable, introducing a production technol-
ogy with even extremely low returns to scale can improve risk-sharing, in the sense that the
distance between the value from the optimal contract and the value from the outside option
becomes smaller. More importantly, we find that for a certain set of endowment economies in
which the efficient allocation is not sustainable, it becomes sustainable once we introduce a
production technology with small returns to scale. In general, the statement holds with any
returns to scale higher than the threshold.
The implications of a limited commitment to a transaction have been studied extensively
in recent decades.1 With a growing interest in models with limited commitment, a few papers
1The models with limited commitment have been used to understand asset pricing (e.g., Alvarez and Jerman
(2000); Azariadisa and Kaas (2007)); international finance (e.g., Kehoe and Perri (2002); Aguiar et al (2008));
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theoretically investigate the properties of a production economy under limited commitment.
For example, Kehoe and Perri (2004) and Abraham and Carceles-Poveda (2006) focus on
the decentralization of the constrained efficient allocation in a production economy without
commitment. They show that with additional instruments such as capital income tax or an
upper limit on the intermediaries capital holdings, the constrained efficient allocation can be
decentralized when capital is introduced in an endowment economy. Rather than character-
izing the second-best allocation and its decentralization, we directly characterize the analytic
condition for sustainability with respect to production technologies and provide a new insight
into the properties of a production economy without commitment. There are a few papers
that discuss risk sharing with intertemporal technologies. Krueger and Perri (2006) introduce
a productive tree in a Lucas tree economy and show that the higher is the return on this tree
the more risk sharing can be achieved. Abraham and Laczo (2016) endogenize the size of the
tree (public storage technology) and obtain a non-monotonic result between the return and
the degree of risk sharing. Both papers introduce capital income in the Lucas-tree framework
and their results have similar flavour with ours. Our paper establishes a clear link between
the endowment economy and the production economy in terms of risk sharing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model environment is described
in Section 1. In Section 2, we specify the value from the planner’s problem with commitment.
Section 3 describes the limited commitment in our environment. In Section 4, we analytically
characterize the conditions under which the first-best allocation is sustainable for a determin-
istic case; and we study the implications of the key parameters on the conditions, as well as the
intuition behind the result. The main result derived in Section 4 is verified in a more general
stochastic environment in Section 5. In Section 6, we offer concluding remarks.
firm dynamics (e.g., Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004)); consumption distribution (e.g., Krueger and Perri
(2006)); and political economy (e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2008)).
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1 Environment
Preference The economy consists of two infinitely-lived agents indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}. They
value consumption (c) in each period according to a utility function u(.) which is a strictly
concave, increasing and differentiable function with u′(0) =∞.
Technology Each agent has decreasing returns to scale production technology given by
Y it = A
i
tF (K
i
t) for t = 0, 1, 2, ...
where Kit is capital given to agent i at each t.
Uncertainty There are two states st ∈ {H,L} with respect to the productivity Ait of each
agent i in period t for t = 1, 2, ..., which follows a binary Markov process with transition
probabilities given by
pi(s|s′) = Pr(st+1 = s′ | st = s), s, s′ ∈ {H,L}.
Denote st = (s1, . . . , st). We define pi(s
t) by the probability of st being realized. The
productivity shock is symmetric. In other words, we have either (A1t , A
2
t ) = (1+α, 1−α)
or (1−α, 1+α), so that there is no aggregate productivity shock. At t = 0, the probability
of (A11, A
2
1) = (1 + α, 1− α) is 12 .
The assumption of the negative correlation is a simple way of generating a situation in which
agents are better off ex-ante when they agree on a resource allocation; it not only reduces
consumption volatility, but also enlarges the production possibility frontier by allocating more
resources to the agent who achieves higher productivity. We assume that the planner allocates
capital for each agent after the shock is realized.
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2 Optimal Contract with Commitment
We first derive the optimal contract (the first-best allocation) between two agents without con-
sidering whether one of the agents can deviate from the contract at any given time. The plan-
ner’s problem is to allocate consumption {(c1(st), c2(st))}∞t=1 and capital {(K1(st), K2(st))}∞t=0
to each agent in order to maximize
max E0
[ ∞∑
t=1
βt
(
u(c1t (s
t)) + u(c2t (s
t))
)]
=
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
βt
(
u(c1t (s
t)) + u(c2t (s
t))
)
pi(st|s0)
subject to the resource constraint for each t and st:
(RC)
∑
i=1,2
{ci(st) +Ki(st)} =
∑
i=1,2
{Ait−1F (Ki(st−1)) + (1− δ)Ki(st−1)}
Ki(st) ≥ 0 ∀i
K(st) = K1(st) +K2(st),
for given initial total capital K(s0). β is the discount factor and δ is the depreciation rate of
capital.
The first-order conditions imply that,
u(ci(st)) = µ(st) ∀i = 1, 2 (2.1)
A1(st)
∂F (K1(st))
∂K1(st)
= A2(st)
∂F
(
K(st)−K1(st))
∂K1(st)
(2.2)
1 = β
∑
st+1|st
u′(c(st+1))
u′(c(st))
pi(st+1|st){A2t ∂F(K(st)−K1(st))∂K(st) + (1− δ)},
(2.3)
where µ(st) is the Lagrange multiplier.
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3 Limited Commitment and the Outside Option
This section considers limited commitment and the outside option value. In particular, we
assume each agent can deviate from the optimal contract after the resource is allocated and
before the next period shock is realized.
In order to set up the participation constraint for each agent, we first need to pin down
the outside option value at the beginning of time t defined by V ia (K
i(st)). It is the value the
agent will get from his own planning problem with the initial capital Ki(st). We assume that
once one of the agents deviates from the optimal contract, he cannot form a contract again.
This assumption is rather restrictive but simplifies the analysis considerably.
Note that at the end of time period t− 1 before he is given consumption ct(st), each agent
is assigned Ki(st) amount of capital. Then, the outside option value is the solution to the
following Cass-Koopmans’ problem with the initial condition, ki(st) = Ki(st)2:
Va(K
i(st)) = max
∞∑
j=t
∑
sj |st
βj−tu(ci(sj))pi(sj|st)
subject to
ci(sj) + ki(sj+1) = AijF (k
i(sj)) + (1− δ)ki(sj)
∀sj|st, ∀j ≥ t.
Notice that pi(sj|st) = Pr(sj|st) for j = t, t+ 1, t+ 2, · · ·.
The following participation constraint should be satisfied by both agents in order for an
agent not to deviate from the optimal contract. That is, for all i = 1, 2,
(PCi)
∞∑
j=t
∑
sj |st
βj−tu(ci(sj))pi(sj|st) ≥ V ia (Ki(st)), ∀st, ∀j ≥ t.
The main focus of this paper is to find out when (PCi) is binding and when it is not.
2In order to distinguish the allocation from the optimal contract, we use the lower case letter for the outside
option value.
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4 Deterministic Case
We first consider a deterministic case in which we can derive the analytic solution for both the
value from the optimal contract and the value from the outside option. More specifically, we
assume the following economic environment.
Assumption 1.
pi(st = H |st−1 = L) = pi(st = L |st−1 = H) = 1.
u(c) = log(c), δ = 1, AtF (Kt) = AtK
γ
t where γ ∈ [0, 1).
4.1 Uniform convergence
Before characterizing the sustainablity condition, we first specify a benchmark endowment
economy for comparison with a production economy. The natural candidate is the case when
γ = 0. More precisely, we consider the benchmark endowment economy as the economy in
which each agent receives either {1+α, 1−α, ...} or {1−α, 1+α, ...} sequence of consumption
goods. The Pareto optimal solution for this endowment economy is easily characterized: the
consumption of both agents is 1 in each period.
The next proposition shows that both the value function from the optimal contract and
the value function from the outside option uniformly converges to those of the benchmark
endowment economy as γ goes to zero.
Proposition 1. Let α ∈ [0, 1) and β ∈ [0, 1) be given. Let K be the compact set of interval.
Suppose the interval is sufficiently large so that it includes the initial level of capital and the
steady state level. Then, the value function from the optimal contract in a production economy
(γ > 0) uniformly converges to the value function from the optimal contract in an endowment
economy (γ = 0) on K.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that as with the argument in Proposition 4.1, it is also straightforward to prove
that the value function from the outside option in a production economy (γ > 0) uniformly
converges to the value function from the outside option in an endowment economy (γ = 0)
over K.
In summary, our objective is to investigate how much distortion or improvement of risk-
sharing will occur relative to the benchmark endowment economy if we allow capital accu-
mulation with a production technology indexed by a positive γ. In this case, the benchmark
endowment economy is defined by the uniform limit of the family of production economies
with γ > 0.
4.2 Characterizing the sustainablity condition
We now analytically characterize the set of economies indexed by (α, β, γ) which can support
the optimal contract under limited commitment.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, the first-best allocation is sustainable if and only if
H(α, β, γ) := log Γ(α, γ)− (1− γ){β log(1− α) + log(1 + α)}
(1− βγ)(1 + β) −
(1− β)γ
1− βγ log(1 + α) ≥ 0
(4.1)
where Γ(α, γ) =
(
(1+α)
1
1−γ +(1−α)
1
1−γ
2
)1−γ
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that we define the left-hand-side of the inequality condition (4.1) by H(α, β, γ), the
function of (α, β, γ). Mathematically H is the difference between the value from the optimal
contract and the autarky value. To link our results with the previous literature on an endow-
ment economy without commitment, we first investigate the relationship between (α, β) and
H.
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Corollary 1. For any given α ∈ [0, 1) and γ ∈ [0, 1), there exists a unique βˆ such that for
β > βˆ the first best allocation is sustainable.
Proof. It is easy to verify, H(α, 0, γ) < 0, H(α, 1, γ) > 0, and ∂
2H(α,β,γ)
∂β2
> 0 for any given
α ∈ [0, 1) and γ ∈ [0, 1). Therefore, there is a unique βˆ such that the condition (4.1) is
violated if β < βˆ and (4.1) is satisfied if β ≥ βˆ.
With the same argument, we can prove the following corollary.
Corollary 2. For any given β ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ [0, 1), there exists a unique αˆ such that for
α > αˆ the first best allocation is sustainable.
Corollaries 1 and 2 extend the rather well-known results in the literature into a production
economy. As the income fluctuation rises, or as agents value future consumption more, the
optimal contract, by which agents can achieve risk sharing, is more likely to be sustainable.
This intuition survives for any production technology γ. This confirms the validity of our
modeling approach.
4.3 General relationship between the sustainability condition and
technology
In this section, we present the general relationship between the sustainability condition and γ.
To show general relationship between the sustainability condition and γ, we fix an arbitrary
number for β, and present the sustainability condition with respect to (α, γ).3 Figures 1 ∼
Figure 4 describe the set of (α, γ) which can sustain the optimal contract for β = 0.3, β = 0.5,
β = 0.7,and β = 0.9 respectively.4
3Using the three-dimensional representation is very complicated and not informative since the relation is
non-monotonic among three parameters.
4In all figures, the green area indicates an economy in which the first-best allocation is sustainable, while
the black area is not.
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(Insert Figure 1 here)
Figures 1 describes the set of (α, γ) which can sustain the optimal contract for β = 0.3.
For an endowment economy with (α, β) = (0.87, 0.3) in which the optimal contract is not
satisfied, introducing a production technology with γ = 0.2483 makes the first-best allocation
sustainable. It also indicates that the difference between the value from the optimal contract
and the value from the outside option tends to increase as γ becomes higher. For example,
when α = 0.87, there is a monotonicity in the sense that the optimal contract in fact is
sustainable for all production technologies γ which is greater than 0.2483.
(Insert Figure 3 here)
Figures 3 describes the set of (α, γ) which can sustain the optimal contract for β = 0.7. In
this figure, an endowment economy indexed by (α, β) = (0.35, 0.7) satisfies the sustainability
condition. As γ increase from zero, H decreases, and when γ = 0.0311, the optimal contract
becomes unsustainable. When γ becomes 0.7697, however, the optimal contract is once again
sustainable. In summary, the relationship between the sustainability condition and γ is non-
monotonic.
4.4 Further discussion of the non-monotonicity
We discuss in detail how and why there is non-monotonicity. In particular, we investigate why
the optimal contract is sustainable for one technology but not another.
Given (α, β), as γ increases, the difference between the marginal productivity of capital of
the two agents increases. This means that capital allocated to the agent receiving a positive
shock should also increase to equalize the marginal productivity of capital (MPK) across
agents. Since the value from the outside option is strictly increasing in capital as shown in
the Appendix, the value from the outside option of the agent with a positive shock increases
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as γ increases. On the other hand, the increase in the difference between MPKs means that
the amount of the rise in the aggregate output by optimally allocating capital across agents
also increases. In other words, the value from the optimal contract increases as γ increases.
Therefore, the overall effect of γ is ambiguous.
(Insert Figure 4 here)
To understand the mechanism behind this non-monotonicity, let us consider particular
examples. We consider an economy indexed by (α, β, γ) = (0.1, 0.9, x), x ∈ [0, 1). The sus-
tainability condition for these economies is represented in Figure 4. As shown in Figure 4, the
condition (4.1) is satisfied for γ ∈ [0.96, 1) and is otherwise violated. In this example, the first-
best allocation is not sustainable for an endowment economy with γ = 0, but is sustainable in
a production economy with a large γ.
(Insert Figure 5 here)
We further investigate the time path for output from the optimal contract and the one
from autarky for two particular economies, one satisfying the sustainability condition and the
other not. First, we consider an economy indexed by (α, β, γ) = (0.1, 0.9, 0.5). As shown in
Figure 4, the optimal contract is not sustainable in this economy. Figure 5 draws the output
path by autarky and by the optimal contract. Even if the outcome fluctuation (and hence the
consumption fluctuation) is high in autarky, the agent chooses to deviate from the optimal
contract.
(Insert Figure 6 here)
Second, we consider an economy indexed by (α, β, γ) = (0.1, 0.9, 0.96). As shown in Figure
4, the optimal contract is sustainable in this economy. Figure 6 draws the output path by au-
tarky and by the optimal contract in this economy. This figure shows that the agent does not
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deviate from the optimal contract although the outcome fluctuation (and hence the consump-
tion fluctuation) is relatively low in autarky. The key difference from the economy indexed by
(α, β, γ) = (0.1, 0.9, 0.5), where the agent with a high productivity deviates from the optimal
contract, is that the relative difference between outputs from the optimal contract and outputs
from the autarky is very large in the economy indexed by (α, β, γ) = (0.1, 0.9, 0.96). Figure 5
and Figure 6 clearly illustrate that if gains from efficient resource allocation between agents
are large enough, the agent with high productivity is less likely to deviate from the optimal
contract even if most of the aggregate capital is allocated to the agent, and the agent is allowed
to run away with the allocated capital.
4.5 The sustainability condition near the benchmark endowment
economy
We further investigate the relationship between γ and the condition (4.1) near the endowment
economy. Before we proceed, note that the optimal contract is sustainable in the benchmark
endowment economy if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
β log(1− α) + log(1 + α) < 0. (4.2)
Figure 7 depicts (α, β) which does not satisfy the condition (4.2).
(Insert Figure 7 here)
Condition (4.2) is derived as the limiting case of (4.1) by γ → 0. However, one can equivalently
obtain the same condition by directly analyzing the benchmark endowment economy: the
condition can be derived by comparing the value from the optimal contract and the value from
the autarky in the benchmark endowment economy.
We characterize the set of endowment economies indexed by (α, β) under which the increase
in the value from the optimal contract is relatively more than the increase in the value from the
14
outside option once we introduce the production technology with a small γ into the endowment
economy. In other words, we derive the set of (α, β) satisfying ∂H
∂γ
∣∣∣
γ=0
> 0 as summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Let α ∈ [0, 1) and β ∈ [0, 1) be given. Suppose we introduce a production
technology with γ > 0 into the endowment economy indexed by (α, β) and allow capital ac-
cumulation. Then, for the production economy indexed by (α, β, γˆ) with some small γˆ, the
marginal increase in the value from the optimal contract is relatively more than the marginal
increase in the value from the outside option if and only if the following condition is satisfied.(1 + α
2
− (1− β)β
1 + β
)
log(1 + α) +
(1− α
2
+
(1− β)β
1 + β
)
log(1− α) > 0 (4.3)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Because of the smoothness of H(α, β, ·) with respect to γ, the argument is true for any
γ < γˆ once we find any γˆ satisfying the proposition.
(Insert Figure 8 here)
Figure 8 depicts (α, β) which satisfies the condition (4.3). The relationship with respect to α
and β is non-linear, but the condition is more likely to be satisfied with a large α and either
a large or a small β.
(Insert Figure 9 here)
Figure 9 is the intersection of Figures 7 and 8. As shown by Figure 9, a large portion of those
(α, β) that do not satisfy the sustainablity condition in the endowment economy satisfy the
condition (4.3). For the endowment economy indexed by (α, β) in the colored area of Figure 9,
risk-sharing is improved by introducing a production technology even with an extremely low
returns to scale in the sense that the distance between the value from the optimal contract
and the value from autarky becomes smaller.
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4.6 Further discussion of the sustainability condition
So far, we have demonstrated that introducing a technology into the endowment economy,
even a technology that has extremely low returns to scale, can improve risk sharing. We now
show that for many endowment economies indexed by (α, β) that do not satisfy the sustain-
abilty condition, the first-best allocation becomes sustainable once we introduce a production
technology with a small returns to scale. In general, the statement holds with any returns to
scale higher than the threshold.
We present our results in a two-dimensional space of (α, γ) by fixing β. Figures 10 and
Figure 11 describe the economies which satisfy the condition (4.1) but does not satisfy (4.2),
meaning the first-best allocation is not sustainable in the benchmark endowment economy but
it is sustainable in a production economy.
(Insert Figure 10 here)
The left panel of Figure 10 represents the (α, γ)-plane slice of the three-dimensional space to
which (α, β) values satisfy
β log(1− α) + log(1 + α) = 0.0001 > 0 (4.4)
hence violating condition (4.2). Therefore, the first-best allocation is not sustainable in the
endowment economy indexed by these (α, β) values. Notice that there are many combinations
of (α, β) which satisfy equation (4.4).
Figure 10 describes how the sustainability condition would change for endowment economies
satisfying equation (4.4) if we introduce a production technology with a different returns to
scale. The first-best allocation is sustainable in the greenish area of the plane, where
H(α, β, γ) > 0 and β =
0.0001− log(1 + α)
log(1− α) .
Note thatH(α, β, γ) < 0 in the black area. For a large value of α, introducing a technology with
any returns to scale, except for a very small returns to scale, makes the first-best allocation
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sustainable. For example, if α = 0.85, then γ greater than or equal to 0.0069 satisfies the
sustainability condition. On the other hand, for a relatively low α, a fairly high returns to
scale is required. For example, if α = 0.6, then a technology with γ ≥ 0.505 should be
introduced.
(Insert Figure 11 here)
A similar story is true for Figure 11. In this case, relative to Figure 10, the condition (4.2)
is further violated to the extent that β log(1−α)+log(1+α) = 0.01, while it is 0.0001 at Figure
10. Then, it is necessary to introduce a technology with a higher returns to scale to make the
optimal allocation sustainable. For example, when α = 0.85, γ greater than or equal to 0.2289
is required to make the optimal contract sustainable. Similarly, when α = 0.6, γ greater than
or equal to 0.5976 is required. As the violations of condition (4.2) become deeper, there is a
tendency to have to introduce a technology with a higher value of γ to achieve sustainability,
but this tendency is not monotonic as we demonstrated before.
5 Stochastic Case
This section investigates the stochastic case. While there is no analytic characterization avail-
able as in the deterministic case, we confirm that the baseline intuition presented in the previ-
ous section still holds for the stochastic case by using numerical computations. In fact, other
than the fact that the sustainability condition is more easily violated when the persistence of
the idiosyncratic shock increases, the main intuitions derived in Section 4 hold in a stochastic
environment.5
Notice that as long as there is no aggregate uncertainty, the planner can achieve perfect risk
sharing with commitment even if productivity is random at the individual level. Therefore,
5The computational procedure is described in the Appendix.
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the value from the first-best allocation in the stochastic environment is the same as the one
in the deterministic case. The difference in the stochastic environment is solely driven by the
change in the values from the outside option.
Let pi(st = H |st−1 = L) = pi(st = L |st−1 = H) = pi. As the shock becomes more persistent,
that is, as 1−pi approaches one, the autarky value of the agent with a positive shock increases
and hence the participation constraint is more easily violated.
(Insert Table 1 here)
To see how the sustainability condition changes as the shock becomes more persistent, we
consider the following five benchmark deterministic cases: (1) (α, β, γ) = (0.135, 0.9, 0.35), (2)
(α, β, γ) = (0.14, 0.9, 0.35), (3) (α, β, γ) = (0.15, 0.9, 0.35), (4) (α, β, γ) = (0.16, 0.9, 0.35), (5)
(α, β, γ) = (0.175, 0.9, 0.35). For each benchmark case, we gradually increase the persistence
of the idiosyncratic shock, and see whether the first-best allocation is sustainable. The results
are shown in Table 1. For all cases, the first-best allocation becomes less sustainable, as the
persistence of the shock increases. Moreover, when α is smaller, and hence when the gains
from the first-best allocation is smaller (Corollary 2), the sustainability condition is easier to
be violated. Table 2 shows the similar results with respect to change in γ. Unlike to Table 1
there is no monotonicity with respect to γ; however, the pattern is similar in the sense that
the first-best allocation becomes less sustainable, as the persistence of the shock increases.
(Insert Table 2 here)
Similar to Figure 4, we plot (α, γ) which satisfies the sustainability condition in a stochastic
environment. Fixing β = 0.9, we plot four figures with six different persistence (1 − pi =
0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5). The result rarely changes when the persistence increases from 0 to 0.5.
When the persistence further increases, the economy with low α is more likely to violate the
sustainability condition, as shown in Table 1. In general, the economy with low γ is also more
likely to violate the sustainability condition.
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(Insert Figure 12 here)
Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 12 are typical results in the stochastic environment. Overall, as
shocks become more persistent, the first-best allocation is less likely to be sustainable since the
outside option becomes higher (while the optimal contract provides the same value for both
the deterministic and stochastic cases).
6 Conclusion
We study the implications of limited commitment for the first-best allocation in a production
economy. To this end, we present a model in which two infinitely-lived agents with the same
decreasing returns to scale technology face a negatively correlated productivity shock. Under
a parametric assumption, the economy is characterized by the subjective discount factor (β),
the extent of productivity shock (α) and the returns to scale of production technology (γ). We
derive the analytic condition under which the first-best allocation is sustainable with limited
commitment. We show that gains from efficient resource allocation between agents can be so
large that they can compensate for the increase in the outside option that arises when capital
moves from the less-productive to the more-productive agent.
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Appendix: Proofs, Computational Procedure for Stochas-
tic Cases, Tables and Figures
A Proofs
Value function from the optimal contract
We first derive the analytic solution to the value function from the optimal contract. Let us
redefine the production function as
Yt = AtK
γ
t = K
γ
t l
1−γ
t = Fˆ (Kt, lt),
where lt ∈ {(1 + α)
1
1−γ , (1 − α) 11−γ }. Note that the production function is the same as before
with a different notation. Let Ω(α, γ) be {(1 + α) 11−γ + (1− α) 11−γ }/2.
(2.2) implies that
Fˆ1(K
1
t , l
1
t ) = Fˆ1(K
2
t , l
2
t ).
By homogeneity we have
K1t
l1t
=
K2t
l2t
. Let us define kft =
K1t
l1t
=
K2t
l2t
=
K1t +K
2
t
l1t+l
2
t
. Notice that c1t = c
2
t ,
l1t + l
2
t = 2Ω and k
f
t =
K
2Ω
. The resource constraint collapses to
ct + k
f
t+1Ω(α, γ) = f(k
f
t )Ω(α, γ), (A.1)
where f(k) = Fˆ (k, 1) = kγ. Hence, by the equal treatment condition the planner’s problem is
to maximize
∑t
t=0 β
tu(ct) subject to (A.1). This is the same as the classical Cass-Koopmans
growth model. Therefore, the solution with full enforcement is easily given by
cft = (1− βγ)Ω(α, γ)f(kft ) and kft+1 = βγf(kft ).
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Recursively, we have kft+j = (βγ)
1−γj
1−γ (kft )
γj . Therefore, the value at given capital kft is
V (kft ) =
∞∑
j=0
βj log(ct+j)
=
∞∑
j=0
βj log
(
(1− βγ)Ω(α, γ)f(kft+j)
)
=
log
(
(1− βγ)Ω(α, γ)
)
1− β + γ
∞∑
j=0
βj log(kft+j)
=
log
(
(1− βγ)Ω(α, γ)
)
1− β +
γ log(βγ)
1− γ
(
1
1− β −
1
1− γβ
)
+
γ log kft
1− βγ
=
1
1− β
[
log
(
(1− βγ)Ω(α, γ)
)
+
βγ log(βγ)
1− βγ
]
+
γ log kft
1− βγ .
Value function from the outside option
Suppose an agent is given K unit of capital and wants to deviate. Then, the autarky values
(Va(K,H), Va(K,L)) are given by the following Bellman equation.
Va(K,L) = max
K′=K′(L)
log
(
(1− α)Kγ −K ′
)
+ βVa(K
′, H)
Va(K,H) = max
K′=K′(H)
log
(
(1 + α)Kγ −K ′
)
+ βVa(K
′, L), (A.2)
where K ′(s) is investment given the current state s ∈ {H,L}. Note that in the deterministic
case we consider, pi(H|H) = pi(L|L) = 0. We proceed with the following guess and verify the
argument. Guess that
Va(K,L) = aL logK + x and Va(K,H) = aH logK + y.
The first order condition and the envelop theorem give aH = aL =
γ
1−βγ and
K ′(L) = βγF (K, 1− α) and K ′(H) = βγF (K, 1 + α). (A.3)
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Then, putting (A.3) into the Bellman equation (A.2), we can match the coefficients with
respect to x and y to get the following linear equation: 1 −β
−β 1

x
y
 =
log(1− βγ) + βγ1−βγ log(βγ) + 11−βγ log(1− α)
log(1− βγ) + βγ
1−βγ log(βγ) +
1
1−βγ log(1 + α)
 .
Then, we get
x =
1
1− β
[
log(1− βγ) + βγ
1− βγ log(βγ)
]
+
log(1− α) + β log(1 + α)
(1− βγ)(1− β)(1 + β)
y =
1
1− β
[
log(1− βγ) + βγ
1− βγ log(βγ)
]
+
β log(1− α) + log(1 + α)
(1− βγ)(1− β)(1 + β)
which verifies the guess.
Proof of Proposition 1
Given the policy function kft+1 = βγf(k
f
t ) which is derived above, the sequence of {kt} with any
initial capital k0 converges the steady state k
∗ = (βγ)
1
1−γ . Therefore, it is sufficient to consider
the uniform convergent over [k0, k
∗] or [k∗, k0]. Without loss of generality, we consider the case
where k0 < k
∗. Note that each agent can consume one unit of consumption for all periods
from the optimal contact in the endowment economy. Therefore, the value function from the
optimal contract in the endowment economy is zero with log utility. To show the uniform
convergence, it is sufficient to find γ such that |V (k, γ) < | for γ < γ for all k ∈ [k0, k∗].
Denote V (k, γ) = G(γ) + γ log k
1−βγ . We first consider the pointwise convergence at k
∗. Since
limγ→0G(γ) = 0, we can find γ1 such that |G(γ)| < 2 is satisfied for γ < γ1 . If we take
γ2 (k
∗) as 
2 log k∗+β , then |γ log k
∗
1−βγ | < 2 for γ < γ2 (k∗). Define γ(k∗) as min{γ1 , γ2 (k∗)}. Then
|V (k∗, γ)| <  for any γ < γ(k∗). Therefore, V (k, γ) converges to zero pointwise at k∗. In fact,
if we take γ = γ(k
∗), then |V (k, γ)| <  for any γ < γ for all k ∈ [k0, k∗] since log k < log k∗
for any k ∈ [k0, k∗). This completes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Notice that piH = piL = 0 implies Va(K,L) < Va(K,H) where Va(K, s) is the outside option
value given capital K with state s ∈ {H,L}. An agent will choose autarky only when he
receives a large endowment. Therefore, he will never deviate if the following is satisfied:
V (
K
2Ω
) ≥ Va(K(1 + α)
1
1−γ
2Ω
, H).
The above inequality is equivalent to (4.1), which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
The partial derivative of H with respect to γ yields
∂H
∂γ
= − log
((1 + α) 11−γ + (1− α) 11−γ
2
)
+
1
1− γ
((1 + α) 11−γ log(1 + α) + (1− α) 11−γ log(1− α)
(1 + α)
1
1−γ + (1− α) 11−γ
)
+
1− β
(1− βγ)2
(β{log(1− α)− log(1 + α)}
1 + β
)
.
Therefore, ∂H
∂γ
∣∣∣
γ=0
> 0 generates the equation (4.3).
B Computational Procedure for Stochastic Case
1. Derive the value function from the first-best allocation.
V (K) = max{c,K1,K2,K′} log(c) + βV (K
′)
subject to
c =
1
2
{
(1 + α)F (K1) + (1− α)F (K2) + (1− δ)K −K ′
}
for K = K1 +K2.
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2. Derive the value function for autarky.
Va(k, s) = max{c,k} log(c) + βE [Va(k′, s′)|s]
subject to
c = A(s)F (k) + (1− δ)k − k′.
3. Given K, Ki is given by the policy function derived in Step 1, Ki = Ki(K). The
first-best allocation is sustainable if and only if
V (K) ≥ Va(K1(K), H).
C Tables and Figures
Table 1: Persistence of Shock and the Sustainability Condition
Persistence (1− pi)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.135 O X X X X X
0.14 O O X X X X
α 0.15 O O O X X X
0.16 O O O O X X
0.175 O O O O O X
NOTE: For all simulations, β and γ are fixed as 0.9 and 0.35, respectively. 1 − pi represents the persistence
of the idiosyncratic shock. 1− pi = 0 corresponds to the benchmark deterministic case. O and X indicate the
first-best allocation being sustainable and not being sustainable, respectively.
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Table 2: Persistence of Shock and the Sustainability Condition
Persistence (1− pi)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.1 O O O X X X
0.2 O O O X X X
0.3 O O O X X X
0.4 O O O X X X
γ 0.5 O O X X X X
0.6 O O X X X X
0.7 O O O X X X
0.8 O O O O O X
0.9 O O O O O O
NOTE: For all simulations, β and α are fixed as 0.9 and 0.1, respectively. 1− pi represents the persistence of
the idiosyncratic shock. 1 − pi = 0 corresponds to the benchmark deterministic case. O and X indicate the
first-best allocation being sustainable and not being sustainable, respectively.
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Figure 1: Left: (α, γ) satisfying H(α, β = 0.3, γ) > 0; Right: H(α, β = 0.3, γ)
NOTE: Left: The green area indicates an economy in which the first-best allocation is sustainable; Right: The
green meshed line indicates the value for H(α, β = 0.3, γ) and the black surface indicates H = 0.
Figure 2: Left: (α, γ) satisfying H(α, β = 0.5, γ) > 0; Right: H(α, β = 0.5, γ)
NOTE: Left: The green area indicates an economy in which the first-best allocation is sustainable; Right: The
green meshed line indicates the value for H(α, β = 0.5, γ) and the black surface indicates H = 0.
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Figure 3: Left: (α, γ) satisfying H(α, β = 0.7, γ) > 0; Right: H(α, β = 0.7, γ)
NOTE: Left: The green area indicates an economy in which the first-best allocation is sustainable; Right: The
green meshed line indicates the value for H(α, β = 0.7, γ) and the black surface indicates H = 0.
Figure 4: Left: (α, γ) satisfying H(α, β = 0.9, γ) > 0; Right: H(α, β = 0.9, γ)
NOTE: Left: The green area indicates an economy in which the first-best allocation is sustainable; Right: The
green meshed line indicates the value for H(α, β = 0.9, γ) and the black surface indicates H = 0.
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Figure 5: Time path for output per capita (α = 0.1, β = 0.9,γ = 0.5, K0 = 0.1)
NOTE: The blue line represents the outside option value with k0 = K0/2. The dotted green line represents
the value from the optimal contract.
Figure 6: Time path for output per capita (α = 0.1, β = 0.9,γ = 0.96, K0 = 0.1)
NOTE: The blue line represents the outside option value with k0 = K0/2. The dotted green line represents
the value from the optimal contract.
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Figure 7: (α, β) not satisfying the sustainability condition in the endowment economy
NOTE: (α, β) with color indicates an endowment economy not satisfying the sustainability condition.
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Figure 8: (α, β) generating a positive value for the condition (4.3)
NOTE: (α, β) with color indicates the region in which (4.3) is satisfied.
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Figure 9: (α, β) not satisfying the sustainability condition in the endowment economy and
generating a positive value for the condition (4.3)
NOTE: (α, β) with color indicates an endowment economy in which the value from the optimal contract
increases faster than the value from the outside option once we introduce the production technology with γ
which is marginally greater than zero, and at the same time, not satisfying the sustainability condition in the
endowment economy.
32
Figure 10: Left: (α, γ)-plane satisfying β = 0.0001−log(1+α)
log(1−α) . In this case, H(α, β =
0.0001−log(1+α)
log(1−α) , γ) > 0 for the greenish area while H(α, β =
0.0001−log(1+α)
log(1−α) , γ) < 0 for the black
area; Right: The greenish surface plots H(α, β = 0.0001−log(1+α)
log(1−α) , γ) values in three-dimension.
Figure 11: Left: (α, γ)-plane satisfying β = 0.01−log(1+α)
log(1−α) . In this case, H(α, β =
0.01−log(1+α)
log(1−α) , γ) > 0 for the greenish area while H(α, β =
0.01−log(1+α)
log(1−α) , γ) < 0 for the black
area; Right: The greenish surface plots H(α, β = 0.01−log(1+α)
log(1−α) , γ) values in three-dimension.
33
Figure 12: (α, γ) satisfying the sustainability condition: Top Left: (β, 1 − pi) = (0.9, 0), Top
Right: (β, 1− pi) = (0.9, 0.1), Middle Left: (β, 1− pi) = (0.9, 0.2), Middle Right: (β, 1− pi) =
(0.9, 0.3), Bottom Left: (β, 1− pi) = (0.9, 0.4), Bottom Right: (β, 1− pi) = (0.9, 0.5)
NOTE: (α, γ) with color indicates the economy satisfying the sustainability condition. The domain for α and
γ is {0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.99}. 34
